THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF PARTIAL REGULATORY TAKING CLAIMS

The concepts of causation and proportionately are increasingly recognized as critical elements in applying the core policy of horizontal equity reflected in the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan established just such cause-and-effect and proportionality “substantial nexus” tests for development exactions.

The concepts of causation and proportionately are increasingly recognized as critical elements in applying the core policy of horizontal equity reflected in the Takings Clause. [1]  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan [2] and Dolan [3] established just such cause-and-effect and proportionality “substantial nexus” tests for development exactions.  Both of these court decisions, which brought to forefront considerations of causation and proportionality as related to horizontal equity in the allocation of the burdens imposed by regulation, have served to enhance and support application of partial  benefit-extraction taking analysis in recent court decisions [4]  Subsequent court decision have applied these types of nexus standards to a variety of land use conditions and restrictions. [5]

Justice Scalia’s opinion in the partial taking case, Pennell v. City of San Jose, [6] involving a tenant-hardship rent control provision, clearly embraces this type of nexus consideration:

Traditional land-use regulation (short of that which totally destroys the economic value of property) does not violate this principle because there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy.  Since the owner’s use of the property is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly.  Thus, the common zoning regulations requiring subdividers to observe lot-size and set-back restrictions, and to dedicate certain areas to public streets, are in accord with our constitutional traditions because the proposed property use would otherwise be the cause of excessive congestion. [7]

Even in cases where this cause-and-effect nexus standard may be perceived to be satisfied by characterization of the government action as addressing a social harm by preventing the absence of the “benefit” secured by regulation, [8] the ul...